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Michael N. Huhns • University of South Carolina • huhns@sc.edu I usually prefer to deal with rational people. In the vernacular, being rational means being reasonable -that is, using reason when making decisions, taking actions, and achieving goals. Rational people tend to be more predictable and, therefore, understandable. Understanding a decision makes it easier for me to accept it.
When I encounter and interact with agents on the Web, or when my own agents encounter them, I prefer that these agents behave rationally as well. An agent can behave rationally in at least three ways. Some of these might be better than others; some might be appropriate for individuals but not for groups.
Rationality Types
A rationality theory indicates what is rational and what is not in specific cases. Three such theories that govern an agent's behavior are logical rationality, economic rationality, and pragmatic rationality. They depend, respectively, on the mathematics of logic, probability, and computation. To conform to their corresponding mathematical formalism, each type requires strong assumptions about the nature of a rational agent's world and how the agent can sense and act in that world.
Logical Rationality
In the fourth century BC, the Greek philosopher Aristotle formulated a process for reasoning that would lead to irrefutable conclusions. His system of syllogisms (a kind of inference mechanism) could produce not only new knowledge, but also a means to achieve goals based on logically justified actions.
The resultant view -that reasoning could be specified precisely and thus mechanized -evolved in the early 20th century into the doctrine of logical positivism, which held that everything an agent knows can be derived from observation sentences that represent the agent's environment. The derivations come from applying laws of deductive logic.
Deductive logic provides rational constraints on belief in two ways. First, it can be used to define the notion of deductive consistency and inconsistency: deductive inconsistency determines a kind of incoherence in belief. Second, the laws of deductive logic can constrain admissible changes in belief by providing deductive rules of inference. For example, modus ponens is a deductive rule of inference that requires Q to be inferred from sentences P and P → Q. So, to be logically rational, an agent "simply" has to convert everything it senses into a sentence (a belief) in a formal language, combine the sentences with all other sentences it has sensed or derived, derive new sentences about its world, and use this new set of sentences to choose its actions.
Several major problems cloud this approach. First, observations about the world might be uncertain and incomplete, making them difficult to express logically. Second, several courses of action could lead to a goal's achievement, and it is difficult for logic to help an agent decide among them. Third, there might not be any action that an agent can prove will achieve its goal, leaving the agent without help in deciding what to do. Finally, reasoning about a large set of sentences might be intractable.
Economic Rationality
Another option is for agents to be economically rational. 1 Like logically rational agents, economically rational ones act to achieve their goals on the basis of what they know. Operationally, however, an economically rational agent ranks possible actions by the expected utility of their results and then executes the action that has the highest expected utility. (Expected utility is defined in terms of the agent's possible actions, the probabilities of the actions' outcomes, and the agent's ranked preferences among those outcomes.) Put simply, economic rationality is based on decision theory, which combines logic and probability theory with utility theory to provide a means for making decisions under uncertainty.
Applying probability theory to rationality is attributed to the Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61).
2 Bayesian epistemology's two main features are the introduction of a formal apparatus for inductive logic and the introduction of a pragmatic self-defeat test for epistemic rationality as a way to extend justification of the laws of deductive logic to include inductive logic. 3 The formal apparatus adds standards of probabilistic coherence and a rule of probabilistic inference, both of which apply to degrees of belief (degrees of confidence). Bayesian decision theory is now the dominant theoretical model for both the descriptive and normative analyses of decisions.
Unfortunately, economic rationality requires a computationally expensive search over the outcomes of all possible sequences of actions (because several actions might be needed to achieve a goal), knowledge of the probability distributions for the outcomes (which are difficult to determine), and a means for assigning utilities to outcomes. 4 
Pragmatic Rationality
The earlier approaches to rationality rely on the assumption that the world will not significantly change while the agent decides what to do, and that an action that is rational when decision-making begins will be rational when it concludes. Clearly, this is problematic in real-world settings. Imagine a car-driving agent waiting at a stop sign. The agent looks both ways, does not see any other vehicles, and then, remembering that it dropped its map, rummages on the floor for several minutes to find it. Finally, with map in hand, it deduces from its observations that there are no approaching vehicles and drives blithely across the intersection.
Similarly, if proving that it was safe to cross the intersection took longer than the time for the traffic status to change, the resultant proof would be worthless. A pragmatic approach takes such computational limitations into account.
According to Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, 2 this means doing "the right thing." Formally, they define this as "For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has."
When agents have limited abilities, the best they can achieve is bounded rationality. The ideal of logical or economic rationality requires choosing actions to maximize a measure of expected utility. That utility should reflect a complete and consistent preference order and probability measure over all possible contingencies. This requirement appears too strong to permit an accurate specification for realistic individual agent behavior.
We can weaken the ideal requirements for rationality in many ways. Possibilities include anytime algorithms that return the best action found each time they terminate and theories that attempt to mimic human decision making. Because of the rich variety of psychological types we can observe in humans -each with different reasoning strengths and limitations -it is unlikely that there will be a single best approach to pragmatic rationality. 
Rationality and Multiagents
Rationality is important for groups of agents as well. If all agents in a group are individually rational, no matter what type of rationality they use, will the group necessarily behave rationally? That is, will the group always make the decisions, take the actions, and achieve the goals that are best for it? This question is important for governments, political organizations, corporations, teams, and committees. An agent's best strategy often depends on what strategies other agents choose. For each agent in a group to behave rationally by maximizing its self-interest, for example, it must consider the behaviors of other agents who are also behaving in their own self-interest. This consideration is the basis of game theory, which provides mathematical guidance for how agents in a multiagent system decide their actions.
In open or continuous environments, deciding what is best depends on a time horizon -it is usually impractical for agents to reason infinitely far into the future or to consider an infinite number of intermediate states. For a given finite time horizon, an agent must choose a strategy that considers either the consequences of just the end result or the consequences of both the ends and the means. When the agents are part of a society, ethics can provide some guidance. The ethical theory egoism holds that action should maximize self-interest. A parallel theory called utilitarianism holds that action should maximize the universal good of all agents. Both theories consider only the end result (they are teleological); they hold that the best thing to do is always maximize a certain good, in which good can be interpreted as pleasure, preference satisfaction, interest satisfaction, or aesthetic ideals. In contrast, deontological theories hold that the ends do not justify the means, and agents must at each step choose the action that does not endanger society's welfare.
Conclusion
Rationality alone is insufficient to specify agent design. Using economic theory, we can program agents to behave in ways that maximize their utility while responding to environmental changes. However, economic models for agents, although general in principle, are typically limited in practice because the value functions that are tractable essentially reduce an agent to acting selfishly. 2 Building a stable social system from a collection of agents motivated by self-serving interests is difficult.
Finally, understanding rationality and knowledge requires interdisciplinary results from artificial intelligence, distributed computing, economics and game theory, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. A complete theory involves semantic models for knowledge, belief, action, and uncertainty; bounded rationality and resource-bounded reasoning; commonsense epistemic reasoning; reasoning about mental states; belief revision; and interactions in multiagent systems.
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